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Public health and expert failure

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  • Roger Koppl

    (Syracuse University)

Abstract

In a modern democracy, a public health system includes mechanisms for the provision of expert scientific advice to elected officials. The decisions of elected officials generally will be degraded by expert failure, that is, the provision of bad advice. The theory of expert failure suggests that competition among experts generally is the best safeguard against expert failure. Monopoly power of experts increases the chance of expert failure. The risk of expert failure also is greater when scientific advice is provided by only one or a few disciplines. A national government can simulate a competitive market for expert advice by structuring the scientific advice it receives to ensure the production of multiple perspectives from multiple disciplines. I apply these general principles to the United Kingdom’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).

Suggested Citation

  • Roger Koppl, 2023. "Public health and expert failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 101-124, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:195:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-021-00928-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-021-00928-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Miozzi & Benjamin Powell, 2023. "The pre-pandemic political economy determinants of lockdown severity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 167-183, October.
    2. Nick Cowen & Eric Schliesser, 2024. "Novel externalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 201(3), pages 557-578, December.
    3. Vincent Miozzi & Benjamin Powell, 2024. "The Evolution of US State Economic Freedom during the Pandemic’s Second Year," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 39(Summer 20), pages 9-29.
    4. Ilia Murtazashvili & Yang Zhou, 2024. "Complex externalities, pandemics, and public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 201(3), pages 607-622, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pandemic; Experts; Covid; Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies; Scientific advice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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