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Stable money and central bank independence: implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany

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  • Carsten Hefeker

    (University of Siegen
    CESifo)

Abstract

Germany prides itself in having one of the most successful central banks and national currencies with respect to independence and stability. I show that not only were both imposed on the country after 1945, but that German experts and officials resisted both initially. It thus represents a rare case of the successful imposition of institutions from abroad. Events are discussed in light of Peter Bernholz’s requirements of stable money and an independent central bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Carsten Hefeker, 2021. "Stable money and central bank independence: implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 287-308, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00734-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00734-z
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Currency reform; Bundesbank; Central bank independence; Institutional reform;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-

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