Legislative bargaining with costly communication
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00682-8
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Cited by:
- Baranski, Andrzej & Haas, Nicholas, 2023. "The timing of communication and retaliation in bargaining: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
- Merkel, Anna & Vanberg, Christoph, 2023. "Multilateral bargaining with subjective claims under majority vs. unanimity rule: An experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
- Klaus Abbink & Lu Dong & Lingbo Huang, 2022. "Talking Behind Your Back: Communication and Team Cooperation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5187-5200, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bargaining; Communication; Baron and Ferejohn bargaining game; Distributional preferences; Proportionality; Fairness; Experiments;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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