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Unpacking pivotal politics: exploring the differential effects of the filibuster and veto pivots

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  • Thomas R. Gray

    (University of Texas at Dallas)

  • Jeffery A. Jenkins

    (University of Southern California)

Abstract

Formal models of politics regularly combine assumptions about a variety of actors and institutions to produce equilibrium expectations, which serve as the primary target for empirical testing. Yet the underlying assumptions can vary in their accuracy among actors and across time and context. We focus on the pivotal politics model of lawmaking and argue that a full evaluation of the theory requires a granular analysis of its two primary components: the filibuster and veto “pivots” in Congress. We show that both types of pivots contribute to the success of pivotal politics in explaining postwar lawmaking, but that the relevance of each varies based on institution-specific contexts. Specifically, the filibuster pivot has little explanatory power before the 1970s, when norms of filibuster use were quite restrictive, while the veto pivot’s explanatory power is limited to situations in which the president has sufficient public backing to be a force in the legislative process.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas R. Gray & Jeffery A. Jenkins, 2017. "Unpacking pivotal politics: exploring the differential effects of the filibuster and veto pivots," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 359-376, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0450-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0450-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fang‐Yi Chiou & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2003. "When Pivotal Politics Meets Partisan Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(3), pages 503-522, July.
    2. Richman, Jesse, 2011. "Parties, Pivots, and Policy: The Status Quo Test," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 151-165, February.
    3. Woon, Jonathan & Cook, Ian Palmer, 2015. "Competing Gridlock Models and Status Quo Policies," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 385-399, July.
    4. Thomas L. Brunell & Bernard Grofman & Samuel Merrill, 2016. "The volatility of median and supermajoritarian pivots in the U.S. Congress and the effects of party polarization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 183-204, January.
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