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Do the Affluent Override Average Americans? Measuring Policy Disagreement and Unequal Influence

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  • Jarron Bowman

Abstract

Objective In this article, I seek to adjudicate between contradictory findings in studies of unequal responsiveness that focus on policy issues over which affluent and average Americans disagree. Methods I assess the impact of 22 definitions of policy disagreement and two methods of measuring policy influence—based on win rates and policy change rates—on analyses of unequal responsiveness. Results Win rates are an unreliable measure of influence and comparing policy change rates across cases of agreement and disagreement minimizes bias and allows for a more direct measure of relative independent policy influence. When income groups disagree over proposed policy changes, the preferences of the affluent—but not those of the middle—significantly impact the likelihood that the policies are implemented. Conclusion My results support previous findings that the affluent have substantial influence over policy making while average Americans have little to no influence.

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  • Jarron Bowman, 2020. "Do the Affluent Override Average Americans? Measuring Policy Disagreement and Unequal Influence," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(3), pages 1018-1037, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:101:y:2020:i:3:p:1018-1037
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12791
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Flavin, 2015. "Direct Democracy and Political Equality in the American States," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 96(1), pages 119-132, March.
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    5. Lax, Jeffrey R. & Phillips, Justin H. & Zelizer, Adam, 2019. "The Party or the Purse? Unequal Representation in the US Senate," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(4), pages 917-940, November.
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    1. John Iceland, 2021. "US disparities in affluence by household structure, 1959 to 2017," Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 44(28), pages 653-698.
    2. Dorman,Peter, 2022. "Alligators in the Arctic and How to Avoid Them," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316516270, October.

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