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Electoral thresholds and political representation

Author

Listed:
  • Thushyanthan Baskaran

    (University of Siegen)

  • Mariana Lopes da Fonseca

    (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance)

Abstract

We rely on a reform in the German federal state of Hesse that abolished a 5 % electoral threshold for local elections to study the effects of electoral thresholds on political representation. The elimination of the threshold had, on average, a stronger effect on municipalities with larger councils since implicit (also known as effective) electoral thresholds are inversely correlated with council size. Using a dataset that includes all 426 Hessian municipalities over the period 1989–2011 and exploiting discontinuities in a state law that maps populations exogenously to council size, we implement a difference-in-discontinuities design. Our results show that the reform had large psychological effects that eventually improved the electoral prospects of (relatively small) local parties. In the short-run, however, the vote and seat shares of the large national parties increased. We offer some explanations for this finding.

Suggested Citation

  • Thushyanthan Baskaran & Mariana Lopes da Fonseca, 2016. "Electoral thresholds and political representation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 117-136, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:169:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0378-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0378-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2016. "Electoral competition and endogenous political institutions: Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 43-61.
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    5. Andrew C. Eggers & Ronny Freier & Veronica Grembi & Tommaso Nannicini, 2018. "Regression Discontinuity Designs Based on Population Thresholds: Pitfalls and Solutions," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 62(1), pages 210-229, January.
    6. Moser,Robert G. & Scheiner,Ethan, 2012. "Electoral Systems and Political Context," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107607996, October.
    7. Fiva, Jon H. & Folke, Olle, 2016. "Mechanical and Psychological Effects of Electoral Reform," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 265-279, April.
    8. Caroline M. Hoxby, 2000. "The Effects of Class Size on Student Achievement: New Evidence from Population Variation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1239-1285.
    9. Moser,Robert G. & Scheiner,Ethan, 2012. "Electoral Systems and Political Context," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107025424, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Palguta, Ján, 2019. "Political representation and public contracting: Evidence from municipal legislatures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 411-431.
    2. Christian R. Grose & Abby K. Wood, 2020. "Randomized experiments by government institutions and American political development," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(3), pages 401-413, December.
    3. Yogesh Uppal, Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2023. "Political fragmentation, fiscal policy and economic growth in Indian States," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 20(2), pages 161-191, December.

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