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The costs of collectivization, per se

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  • James Buchanan
  • Yong Yoon

Abstract

The question of collectivization becomes relevant in the post-financial crisis years as characterized by growing criticism of market organization. Collectivization, the social structure distinguishable from the market or central planning agency, can be costly from overspending. In our analytical framework, the political order remains polycentric. The most widely acceptable institutional solution may be budgetary outlay sufficient to meet all demand, and especially when it is recognized that public criticism of market alternatives is often concentrated on moral goods, e.g., health care. The excess burden of collectivization, per se, is the excess of costs over benefits if the collectivity meets individual demand for the good beyond plausible efficiency levels. The costs of collectivization, per se, can be reduced by separated budgets, showing both revenue and outlay for individual budgetary line items, that bring collective spending decisions closer to the accompanying levy of taxes. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • James Buchanan & Yong Yoon, 2014. "The costs of collectivization, per se," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 321-326, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:3:p:321-326
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0112-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buchanan, James M., 1976. "Taxation in fiscal exchange," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 17-29.
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    6. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collectivization; Polycentric political order; Prisoners’ dilemma; Excess burden; Pure public good; D71; D72; H20; H50;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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