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Implementing the Borda outcome via truncated scoring rules: a computational study

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  • Onur Doğan
  • Ayça Giritligil

Abstract

This study is an attempt to empirically understand the likelihood of choosing the Borda outcome through a truncated scoring rule when n voters are asked to report only part of their linear preferences over m alternatives. We run Monte Carlo simulations through a grid search algorithm as we employ an impartial culture model to sample voters’ preferences. Given the range of parameter values we consider, we report the truncated scoring rules that maximize the likelihood of implementing the Borda outcome and how the maximum likelihood changes with m and n. We also present our results on the relative performances of some popular truncated voting rules, such as plurality and approval voting, in implementing the Borda outcome and demonstrate that two-level approval voting performs significantly better than the plurality rule. Moreover, we propose the expected Borda rule as a good proxy for the best implementor of the Borda rule among all truncated rules. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Onur Doğan & Ayça Giritligil, 2014. "Implementing the Borda outcome via truncated scoring rules: a computational study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 83-98, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:1:p:83-98
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-0019-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Shane Sanders & Justin Ehrlich & James Boudreau, 2024. "Rule selection invariance as a robustness check in collective choice and nonparametric statistical settings," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(1), pages 7-26, April.
    2. D. Marc Kilgour & Jean-Charles Grégoire & Angèle M. Foley, 2022. "Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 365-391, February.
    3. Keith L. Dougherty & Robi Ragan, 2024. "Borda count in a forward agenda," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(1), pages 27-44, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Truncated preference orderings; Truncated scoring rules; Borda rule; C63; D71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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