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Protest voting in plurality elections: a theory of voter signaling

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  • Daniel Kselman
  • Emerson Niou

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  • Daniel Kselman & Emerson Niou, 2011. "Protest voting in plurality elections: a theory of voter signaling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 395-418, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:148:y:2011:i:3:p:395-418
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9661-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Franklin, Mark & Niemi, Richard & Whitten, Guy, 1994. "The Two Faces of Tactical Voting," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(4), pages 549-557, October.
    2. Alvarez, R. Michael & Nagler, Jonathan, 2000. "A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 57-75, January.
    3. Adams, James & Clark, Michael & Ezrow, Lawrence & Glasgow, Garrett, 2004. "Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Election Results?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 589-610, October.
    4. Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "Plurality Maximization vs Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 772-791, September.
    5. Rosenthal, Howard & Sen, Subrata, 1973. "Electoral Participation in the French Fifth Republic," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 29-54, March.
    6. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    7. Budge, Ian, 1994. "A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(4), pages 443-467, October.
    8. Cox, Gary W., 1994. "Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 608-621, September.
    9. Kselman, Daniel & Niou, Emerson, 2010. "Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 227-244, April.
    10. Riker, William H. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 25-42, March.
    11. Riker, William H. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 25-42, March.
    12. Gutowski, William E & Georges, John P, 1993. "Optimal Sophisticated Voting Strategies in Single Ballot Elections Involving Three Candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 225-247, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aggeborn, Linuz & Persson, Lovisa, 2017. "Public Finance and Right-Wing Populism," Working Paper Series 1182, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Nobuhiro Mizuno & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2022. "Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(3), pages 443-477, July.
    3. Guillem Riambau & Steven Stillman & Geua Boe-Gibson, 2021. "What determines preferences for an electoral system? Evidence from a binding referendum," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 179-208, January.
    4. Philippos Louis & Orestis Troumpounis & Nikolaos Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2020. "Protest voting in the laboratory," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0247, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    5. Wang, Bo & Zhou, Zhen, 2023. "Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 387-406.
    6. Louis, Philippos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Tsakas, Nikolas & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2022. "Coordination with preferences over the coalition size," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 105-123.
    7. Carlo Altomonte & Gloria Gennaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2019. "Collective Emotions and Protest Vote," CESifo Working Paper Series 7463, CESifo.
    8. Antoinette Baujard & Isabelle Lebon, 2022. "Not-so-strategic Voters," Working Papers 2201, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    9. Tina Fransman, 2021. "Voting and protest tendencies associated with changes in service delivery," Working Papers 08/2021, Stellenbosch University, Department of Economics.
    10. Antoinette Baujard & Isabelle Lebon, 2022. "Not-so-strategic voters. Evidence from an in situ experiment during the 2017 French presidential election [Wp Gate 2022-2201]," Working Papers halshs-03607809, HAL.
    11. Simon Otjes & André Krouwel, 2023. "The nuclear option: Voting for the pan-European party Volt," European Union Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 726-750, December.
    12. Kellermann, Kim Leonie, 2017. "Political participation and party capture in a dualized economy: A game theory approach," CIW Discussion Papers 4/2017, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    13. Kim Leonie Kellermann, 2022. "Political inequality, political participation, and support for populist parties," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 461-482, December.
    14. Ping-Hung Chen & Chien-Wen Peng, 2024. "Determinants of Intra-District Residential Mobility – A Case Study of Taipei Metropolitan Area," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 27(3), pages 329-359.

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