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Robust satisficing voting: why are uncertain voters biased towards sincerity?

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  • Lior Davidovitch
  • Yakov Ben-Haim

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  • Lior Davidovitch & Yakov Ben-Haim, 2010. "Robust satisficing voting: why are uncertain voters biased towards sincerity?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 265-280, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:145:y:2010:i:1:p:265-280
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9565-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    2. Myerson, Roger B. & Weber, Robert J., 1993. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(1), pages 102-114, March.
    3. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    4. Yakov Ben-Haim & Karsten Jeske, 2003. "Home bias in financial markets: robust satisficing with info gaps," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2003-35, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    5. Chen, Kong-Pin & Yang, Sheng-Zhang, 2002. "Strategic Voting in Open Primaries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(1-2), pages 1-30, July.
    6. Eckel, Catherine & Holt, Charles A, 1989. "Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 763-773, September.
    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kishishita, Daiki, 2020. "(Not) delegating decisions to experts: The effect of uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Plurality voting; Info-gap decision theory; Sincere voting; Strategic voting; D81; D72; D78;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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