The political-economy of conflicts over wealth: why don’t the rabble expropriate the rich?
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9298-6
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Cited by:
- Thaize Challier, M.-Christine, 2010. "Socio-political conflict, social distance, and rent extraction in historical perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 51-67, March.
- Robert Grafstein, 2018. "The problem of polarization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 315-340, July.
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Keywords
Political-economy; Distribution; Voting; Cooperative game theory; Core;All these keywords.
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