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Is an exemption from US groundwater regulations a loophole or a noose?

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  • Brigham Daniels
  • Erika Weinthal
  • Blake Hudson

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  • Brigham Daniels & Erika Weinthal & Blake Hudson, 2008. "Is an exemption from US groundwater regulations a loophole or a noose?," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 41(3), pages 205-220, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:policy:v:41:y:2008:i:3:p:205-220
    DOI: 10.1007/s11077-008-9064-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barry Weingast, 1984. "The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 147-191, January.
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