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The Politics of M&A Antitrust

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  • MIHIR N. MEHTA
  • SURAJ SRINIVASAN
  • WANLI ZHAO

Abstract

Antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether the political process affects antitrust reviews of merger transactions. We find that acquirers and targets located in the political districts of powerful U.S. congressional members who serve on committees with antitrust regulatory oversight receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes. To establish causality, we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm–politician links and a falsification test. Additional findings suggest congressional members’ incentives to influence antitrust reviews are affected by three channels: special interests, voter and constituent interests, and ideology. In aggregate, our findings suggest that the political process adversely interferes with the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about anticompetitive mergers.

Suggested Citation

  • Mihir N. Mehta & Suraj Srinivasan & Wanli Zhao, 2020. "The Politics of M&A Antitrust," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 5-53, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:58:y:2020:i:1:p:5-53
    DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12291
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    Cited by:

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    3. Yue, Heng & Zhang, Liandong & Zhong, Qinlin, 2022. "The politics of bank opacity," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2).
    4. Joseph A. Clougherty & Nan Zhang, 2021. "Foreign investor reactions to risk and uncertainty in antitrust: U.S. merger policy investigations and the deterrence of foreign acquirer presence," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(3), pages 454-478, April.
    5. Stephan, Andrew P. & Walther, Beverly R. & Wellman, Laura A., 2021. "Profiting from connections: Do politicians receive stock tips from brokerage houses?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1).
    6. Mariotti, Sergio & Marzano, Riccardo, 2021. "The effects of competition policy, regulatory quality and trust on inward FDI in host countries," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(6).
    7. Joseph A. Clougherty & Nan Zhang, 0. "Foreign investor reactions to risk and uncertainty in antitrust: U.S. merger policy investigations and the deterrence of foreign acquirer presence," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 0, pages 1-25.
    8. Mehta, Mihir N. & Zhao, Wanli, 2020. "Politician Careers and SEC enforcement against financial misconduct," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2).

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