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Central Bank Autonomy, the Exchange Rate Constraint and Inflation: The Case of Italy, 1970–1992

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  • Giuseppe Tullio
  • Marcio Ronci

Abstract

This paper analyzes the determinants of inflation in Italy over the period 1970–1992. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of central bank independence in influencing monetary growth, and on the role of monetary growth and of the Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM) in affecting inflation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, when the Bank of Italy lacked independence and the ERM was still not credible, monetary growth was highly unstable and was the main determinant of Italian inflation, although oil price and tax shocks also played a role. After the March 1983 general exchange rate realignment and the French U-turn, the ERM became more credible and monetary growth stopped being a significant determinant of inflation; instead, the German inflation became the main variable influencing Italian inflation. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

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  • Giuseppe Tullio & Marcio Ronci, 1997. "Central Bank Autonomy, the Exchange Rate Constraint and Inflation: The Case of Italy, 1970–1992," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 31-49, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:8:y:1997:i:1:p:31-49
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008233014918
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    1. repec:bla:kyklos:v:41:y:1988:i:4:p:647-62 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Richard C. K. Burdekin & Leroy O. Laney, 1988. "Fiscal Policymaking and the Central Bank Institutional Constraint," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 647-662, November.
    3. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Mark P. Taylor, 1992. "Testing for Credibility Effects," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(3), pages 545-571, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark P. Taylor & Lucio Sarno, 2001. "Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 839-868, September.
    2. Emilio Congregado & Carmen Díaz-Roldán & Vicente Esteve, 2023. "Deficit sustainability and fiscal theory of price level: the case of Italy, 1861–2020," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 50(3), pages 755-782, August.
    3. Elena Seghezza, 2020. "Governor Baffi’s View on the Italian Great Inflation," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(3), pages 563-584, November.
    4. Eugenio Gaiotti & Alessandro Secchi, 2012. "Monetary policy and fiscal dominance in Italy from the early 1970s to the adoption of the euro: a review," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 141, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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