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Implementing and Testing Risk-Preference-Induction Mechanisms in Experimental Sealed-Bid Auctions

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  • Rietz, Thomas A

Abstract

Risk-preference-inducing lottery procedures can serve as valuable tools for experimental economists. However, questioning their effectiveness, experimenters may avoid them even when predictions and conclusions depend crucially on risk preferences. Here, I review risk-preference-induction attempts in sealed-bid auctions, discussing factors that promote or hinder success. Making the procedure very transparent and having subjects learn about it in simple environments promote success. Hysteresis resulting from switching between monetary payoffs and lottery procedures in one environment hinders success. Thus, lottery procedures appear sensitive to the implementation. However, implemented carefully, they can generate behavior consistent with the intended preferences. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Rietz, Thomas A, 1993. "Implementing and Testing Risk-Preference-Induction Mechanisms in Experimental Sealed-Bid Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 199-213, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:7:y:1993:i:2:p:199-213
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    Cited by:

    1. Güth, W. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Weber, M., 1995. "Irrational risk aversion on probabilities : Experimental evidence of deciding between lotteries," Other publications TiSEM 98b7aa86-8e5b-4bd2-9684-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Harrison, Glenn W. & Martínez-Correa, Jimmy & Swarthout, J. Todd, 2013. "Inducing risk neutral preferences with binary lotteries: A reconsideration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 145-159.
    3. Mrinal Ghosh & George John, 2000. "Experimental Evidence for Agency Models of Salesforce Compensation," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(4), pages 348-365, August.
    4. Sabater-Grande, Gerardo & Georgantzis, Nikolaos, 2002. "Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners' dilemma games: an experimental test," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 37-50, May.
    5. Martin Weber & Werner G³th & Eric van Damme, 2005. "Risk Aversion on Probabilities: Experimental Evidence of Deciding Between Lotteries," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 22, pages 192-209.
    6. Kaushal Chari & Manish Agrawal, 2007. "Multi-Issue Automated Negotiations Using Agents," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 19(4), pages 588-595, November.
    7. James C. Cox & Vjollca Sadiraj, 2018. "Incentives," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2018-01, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    8. Berg, Joyce E. & Dickhaut, John W. & Rietz, Thomas A., 2013. "The “play-out” effect and preference reversals: Evidence for noisy maximization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 160-171.
    9. Reinhard Selten & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Klaus Abbink, 1999. "Money Does Not Induce Risk Neutral Behavior, but Binary Lotteries Do even Worse," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 213-252, June.
    10. Boris Maciejovsky & Tarek El-Sehitya & Hans Haumerb & Christian Helmensteinc & Erich Kirchlerd, "undated". "Hindsight Bias and Individual Risk Attitude within the Context of Experimental Asset Markets," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-16, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    11. John Van Huyck & Frederick Rankin & Raymond Battalio, 1999. "What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(2), pages 129-150, December.
    12. Agranov, Marina & Tergiman, Chloe, 2013. "Incentives and compensation schemes: An experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 238-247.

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