IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jmgtgv/v24y2020i1d10.1007_s10997-019-09463-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Insider or outsider? The separate and joint effects of firm performance and diversification on CEO recruitment

Author

Listed:
  • Juehui Shi

    (University at Buffalo, State University of New York)

  • Jurriaan Jong

    (University at Buffalo, State University of New York)

Abstract

This study aims to investigate the effects of firm performance and diversification on the insider/outsider CEO hiring. Using a sample of 2204 CEO succession events occurred between 1979 and 2014 in the U.S., we find that the effect of firm performance on the likelihood of hiring insider CEOs is positive and significant, which is consistent with Datta and Guthrie (1994). Moreover, the impact of the level of firm diversification on the likelihood of hiring insider CEOs is also positive and significant. However, the level of firm diversification appears to have a strong moderating effect on the relationship between firm performance and the insider/outsider CEO hiring. More focused firms are more likely to hire outsider CEOs when firm performance is low, but hire insider CEOs as firm performance increases. By contrast, highly diversified firms are more likely to hire insider CEOs regardless of firm performance. The empirical results imply that both well-performing focused firms and highly diversified firms should implement a formal CEO succession plan by designating the internal candidates and grooming them to ensure that they are knowledgeable and ready to take over when the current CEO steps aside.

Suggested Citation

  • Juehui Shi & Jurriaan Jong, 2020. "Insider or outsider? The separate and joint effects of firm performance and diversification on CEO recruitment," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(1), pages 91-115, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:24:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10997-019-09463-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-019-09463-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10997-019-09463-3
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10997-019-09463-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nancy L. Rose & Andrea Shepard, 1997. "Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 489-514, Autumn.
    2. Danny Miller, 1991. "Stale in the Saddle: CEO Tenure and the Match Between Organization and Environment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(1), pages 34-52, January.
    3. Edward C. Norton & Hua Wang & Chunrong Ai, 2004. "Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 4(2), pages 154-167, June.
    4. Erin Anderson, 1985. "The Salesperson as Outside Agent or Employee: A Transaction Cost Analysis," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(3), pages 234-254.
    5. Rajeswararao Chaganti & Rakesh Sambharya, 1987. "Strategic orientation and characteristics of upper management," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(4), pages 393-401, July.
    6. Gerber, Alan, 1998. "Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(2), pages 401-411, June.
    7. Perryman, Alexa A. & Fernando, Guy D. & Tripathy, Arindam, 2016. "Do gender differences persist? An examination of gender diversity on firm performance, risk, and executive compensation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 579-586.
    8. Dawn Harris & Constance Helfat, 1997. "Specificity of CEO human capital and compensation," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(11), pages 895-920, December.
    9. Anderson, T. W. & Hsiao, Cheng, 1982. "Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 47-82, January.
    10. Kevin J. Murphy, 1986. "Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 59-76, Spring.
    11. Kevin J. Murphy & Ján Zábojník, 2004. "CEO Pay and Appointments: A Market-Based Explanation for Recent Trends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 192-196, May.
    12. Kevin J. Murphy & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "Managerial Capital And The Market For Ceos," Working Paper 1110, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    13. Edward J. Zajac, 1990. "Ceo selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 217-230, March.
    14. Deepak K. Datta & James P. Guthrie, 1994. "Executive succession: Organizational antecedents of ceo characteristics," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(7), pages 569-577, September.
    15. Berry, Tammy K. & Bizjak, John M. & Lemmon, Michael L. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Organizational complexity and CEO labor markets: Evidence from diversified firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 797-817, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shi, Juehui & Lin, Winston T. & Pham, Ngoc Cindy, 2021. "The Relationships Among Managerial Discretion, Firm Performance, and Chief Executive Officer Compensation: A Simultaneous Equations System Approach," American Business Review, Pompea College of Business, University of New Haven, vol. 24(1), pages 114-140, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Greve, Peder & Biemann, Torsten & Ruigrok, Winfried, 2015. "Foreign executive appointments: A multilevel examination," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 674-686.
    2. Tariq Malik & Sajal Kabiraj, 2011. "Effects of Managerial Strategic Resources on the Outsider CEO Succession in Biopharmaceutical Industry," Vision, , vol. 15(2), pages 101-113, June.
    3. Ayse Karaevli & Edward J. Zajac, 2013. "When Do Outsider CEOs Generate Strategic Change? The Enabling Role of Corporate Stability," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(7), pages 1267-1294, November.
    4. Timothy J. Quigley & Adam J. Wowak & Craig Crossland, 2020. "Board Predictive Accuracy in Executive Selection Decisions: How Do Initial Board Perceptions of CEO Quality Correspond with Subsequent CEO Career Performance?," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(3), pages 720-741, May.
    5. Jongjaroenkamol, Prasart & Laux, Volker, 2017. "Insider versus outsider CEOs, executive compensation, and accounting manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 253-261.
    6. Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, 2009. "Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 179-212, April.
    7. Chen, Jie & De Cesari, Amedeo & Hill, Paula & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2018. "Initial compensation contracts for new executives and financial distress risk: An empirical investigation of UK firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 292-313.
    8. Daniel Ferreira & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2015. "Misallocation of Talent in Competitive Labor Markets," Working Papers 740, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    9. Olie René & Heijltjes Mariëlle G. & Glunk Ursula, 2003. "Continuity And Renewal At The Top: Performance Effects Of The Level, Extent, Type And Frequency Of Top Management Team Changes," Research Memorandum 059, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    10. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    11. Jenter, Dirk & Cziraki, Peter, 2021. "The Market for CEOs," CEPR Discussion Papers 16281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Brockman, Paul & Lee, Hye Seung (Grace) & Salas, Jesus M., 2016. "Determinants of CEO compensation: Generalist–specialist versus insider–outsider attributes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 53-77.
    13. Trey Cummings & Anne Marie Knott, 2018. "Outside CEOs and innovation," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(8), pages 2095-2119, August.
    14. Katja Rost & Soren Salomo & Margit Osterloh, 2008. "CEO Appointments and the Loss of Firm-specific Knowledge - Putting Integrity Back into Hiring Decisions," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-27, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    15. Vincent L. Barker , III & George C. Mueller, 2002. "CEO Characteristics and Firm R&D Spending," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(6), pages 782-801, June.
    16. Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar-Datta, 2014. "Upper-echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(12), pages 1853-1866, December.
    17. Eisfeldt, Andrea L. & Kuhnen, Camelia M., 2013. "CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 351-372.
    18. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    19. Ryan Federo & Angel Saz-Carranza & Xavier Fernandez-í-Marin & Carlos Losada, 2023. "CEO selection in intergovernmental organizations: the clash between control and efficiency in governance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(1), pages 155-180, March.
    20. Kevin B. Hendricks & Manpreet Hora & Vinod R. Singhal, 2015. "An Empirical Investigation on the Appointments of Supply Chain and Operations Management Executives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(7), pages 1562-1583, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:24:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10997-019-09463-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.