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The adoption of deferred share unit plans for outside directors: economic and social determinants

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  • Paul André
  • Samer Khalil
  • Michel Magnan

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  • Paul André & Samer Khalil & Michel Magnan, 2012. "The adoption of deferred share unit plans for outside directors: economic and social determinants," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(1), pages 81-105, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:16:y:2012:i:1:p:81-105
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-010-9142-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse & Walker, David I, 2002. "Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58, January.
    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    4. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2005. "The Impact of Stock-Option Compensation for Outside Directors on Firm Value," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(6), pages 2229-2254, November.
    5. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:5:p:2281-2308 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Brian J. Hall, 2003. "Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay," NBER Working Papers 9887, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Linn, Scott C. & Park, Daniel, 2005. "Outside director compensation policy and the investment opportunity set," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 680-715, September.
    8. Dalton, Dan R. & Daily, Catherine M., 2001. "Director Stock Compensation: An Invitation to a Conspicuous Conflict of Interests?," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 89-108, January.
    9. Brick, Ivan E. & Palmon, Oded & Wald, John K., 2006. "CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm performance: Evidence of cronyism?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-423, June.
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    11. Donald C. Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, 1995. "The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: The case of CEO pay raises," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 175-193.
    12. James Cordeiro & Rajaram Veliyath & Edward Eramus, 2000. "An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of Outside Director Compensation," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 268-279, July.
    13. Boone, Audra L. & Casares Field, Laura & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Raheja, Charu G., 2007. "The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 66-101, July.
    14. Linck, James S. & Netter, Jeffry M. & Yang, Tina, 2008. "The determinants of board structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 308-328, February.
    15. Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, 2002. "Power, rent extraction, and executive compensation," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(03), pages 23-28, October.
    16. Gerald F. Davis, 1996. "The Significance of Board Interlocks for Corporate Governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 154-159, July.
    17. Zhilan Feng & Chinmoy Ghosh & C. Sirmans, 2007. "Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in REITs," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 225-251, October.
    18. Samer Khalil & Michel Magnan & Paul André, 2008. "The Adoption of Deferred Share Unit Plans for Outside Directors and Shareholder Wealth," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 210-224, May.
    19. Mason Gerety & Chun-Keung Hoi & Ashok Robin, 2001. "Do Shareholders Benefit from the Adoption of Incentive Pay for Directors?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 30(4), Winter.
    20. Doidge, Craig, 2004. "U.S. cross-listings and the private benefits of control: evidence from dual-class firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 519-553, June.
    21. Brian J. Hall, 2003. "Six Challenges In Designing Equity‐Based Pay," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 15(3), pages 21-33, March.
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