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New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation: an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

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  • Martin Conyon
  • Simon Peck
  • Graham Sadler

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  • Martin Conyon & Simon Peck & Graham Sadler, 2011. "New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation: an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 15(1), pages 29-58, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:15:y:2011:i:1:p:29-58
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-009-9117-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steen Thomsen & Torben Pedersen, 2000. "Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest european companies," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(6), pages 689-705, June.
    2. Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    3. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563, Elsevier.
    4. Henry L. Tosi & Thomas Greckhamer, 2004. "Culture and CEO Compensation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(6), pages 657-670, December.
    5. Axel V. Werder & Till Talaulicar & Georg L. Kolat, 2005. "Compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code: an empirical analysis of the compliance statements by German listed companies," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 178-187, March.
    6. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    7. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
    8. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    9. Edward J. Zajac, 1990. "Ceo selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A theoretical integration and empirical analysis," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 217-230, March.
    10. Brian K. Boyd, 1994. "Board control and ceo compensation," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 335-344, June.
    11. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
    12. Christine Oliver, 1997. "The Influence of Institutional and Task Environment Relationships on Organizational Performance: The Canadian Construction Industry," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 99-124, January.
    13. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bénédicte Brullebaut & Isabelle Allemand & Enrico Prinz & Florence Thépot, 2022. "Persistence in corporate networks through boards of directors? A longitudinal study of interlocks in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 1743-1782, August.
    2. Eduardo Schiehll & Paulo Terra & Fernanda Victor, 2013. "Determinants of voluntary executive stock option disclosure in Brazil," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(2), pages 331-361, May.

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    Keywords

    Executive compensation; Consultants;

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