Collusion Theory in Search of Robust Themes: A Comment on Switgard Feuerstein's Survey
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DOI: 10.1007/s10842-005-4870-y
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- Anderson, E.J. & Cau, T.D.H., 2011. "Implicit collusion and individual market power in electricity markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 211(2), pages 403-414, June.
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Keywords
collusion; robustness; Nash reversion; optimal punishments; renegotiation; tacit cullusion; competition;All these keywords.
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