A note on corporate taxation, limited liability, and asymmetric information
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DOI: 10.1007/s00712-007-0281-3
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- Anton Miglo, 2007. "A note on corporate taxation, limited liability, and asymmetric information," Working Papers 0704, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
References listed on IDEAS
- Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, 2007. "Why is there Corporate Taxation? The Role of Limited Liability Revisited," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 1-10, September.
- Frederique Bracoud & Brian Hillier, 2000. "Equity or Debt? Contracts in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 68(1), pages 1-23, January.
- Gale, William G., 1990.
"Federal lending and the market for credit,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 177-193, July.
- William G. Gale, 1988. "Federal Lending and the Market for Credit," UCLA Economics Working Papers 504, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
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Cited by:
- Ralf Ewert & Rainer Niemann, 2011. "Haftungsbeschränkungen, Verlustverrechnungsbeschränkungen und die Bereitschaft zur Risikoübernahme," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 63(63), pages 94-131, January.
- Ralf Ewert & Rainer Niemann, 2010. "Limited Liability, Asymmetric Taxation, and Risk Taking - Why Partial Tax Neutralities can be Harmful," CESifo Working Paper Series 3301, CESifo.
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More about this item
Keywords
corporate taxation; limited liability; H21; H25;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
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