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Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement

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  • Veronika Grimm

Abstract

We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.
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  • Veronika Grimm, 2007. "Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 1-27, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:90:y:2007:i:1:p:1-27
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-006-0225-3
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    Cited by:

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    2. Onur, Ilke & Bruwer, Johan & Lockshin, Larry, 2020. "Reducing information asymmetry in the auctioning of non-perishable experience goods: The case of online wine auctions," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    3. Saini, Viplav, 2010. "Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 303-306, September.
    4. Shuang Xu & Yong Zhao & Yeming Gong, 2021. "Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 261-292, December.
    5. Veronika Grimm & Friederike Mengel & Giovanni Ponti & Lari Arthur Viianto, 2006. "Investment Incentives in Auctions: An Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics 26, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    6. Li, Sanxi & Sun, Hailin & Yan, Jianye & Yu, Jun, 2015. "Bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 96-106.
    7. Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2015. "Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 114(3), pages 211-238, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sequential auctions; bundling; stochastic scale effects; procurement; D44; H57; D92;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing

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