Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty
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DOI: 10.1007/s00712-014-0413-5
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- William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
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More about this item
Keywords
Bargaining; The Nash solution; ISHARA preference ; Risk aversion; C70; C78;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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