Lender deception as a response to moral hazard
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DOI: 10.1007/s00712-013-0364-2
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- Apergis, Emmanuel & Apergis, Iraklis & Apergis, Nicholas, 2019. "A new macro stress testing approach for financial realignment in the Eurozone," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 52-80.
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More about this item
Keywords
Moral hazard; Lending; Deception; Fraud; D82; K12; G20;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
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