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Conflict and Confluence: The Multidimensionality of Opportunism in Principal–Agent Relationships

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  • Asghar Zardkoohi

    (Texas A&M University)

  • Joseph S. Harrison

    (Texas A&M University)

  • Mathew A. Josefy

    (Texas A&M University)

Abstract

Conventional agency theory typically focuses on a unidirectional problem, in which an agent behaves opportunistically against the interests of a principal. Yet, this conceptualization is too limited to fully describe all aspects of principal–agent relationships. This article presents a more comprehensive framework explaining a potential three-directional problem—that is, (i) agents behave opportunistically against the interests of principals, (ii) principals behave opportunistically against the interests of agents, and (iii) relationships between agents and principals representing confluence of interests affect the interests of third-party stakeholders. The article provides evidence of these problems, describes their unique characteristics, and outlines implications for society. It concludes with a discussion focusing on the implications of the proposed framework for purported governance solutions, the ongoing debate between shareholder and stakeholder views of the firm, and business practices.

Suggested Citation

  • Asghar Zardkoohi & Joseph S. Harrison & Mathew A. Josefy, 2017. "Conflict and Confluence: The Multidimensionality of Opportunism in Principal–Agent Relationships," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 146(2), pages 405-417, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:146:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10551-015-2887-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-015-2887-7
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    2. Kosheek Sewchurran & Johan Dekker & Jennifer McDonogh, 2019. "Experiences of Embedding Long-Term Thinking in an Environment of Short-Termism and Sub-par Business Performance: Investing in Intangibles for Sustainable Growth," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 157(4), pages 997-1041, July.
    3. Andaç T. Arıkan, 2020. "Opportunism is in the Eye of the Beholder: Antecedents of Subjective Opportunism Judgments," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 573-589, January.
    4. Rahul Nilakantan & Deepak Iyengar & Samar K. Datta & Shashank Rao, 2021. "On Ethical Violations in Microfinance Backed Small Businesses: Family and Household Welfare," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 172(4), pages 785-802, September.

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