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Federal tax competition and the efficiency consequences for local taxation of revenue equalization

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  • Christos Kotsogiannis

Abstract

Recent work has shown that a system of equalization grants can limit tax competition among lower-level governments. The structure of such models, however, does not allow for the federal to be an active player but its role is being limited in the administration of the equalization grants. The implication of this is that potentially important, for the efficiency properties of lower-level government taxation, vertical fiscal externalities are ignored. This paper introduces equalization grants into a standard federal capital tax competition model in which fiscal externalities arise not only horizontally, between jurisdictions, but also vertically between the levels of government. It is shown that, even in the presence of vertical fiscal inefficiencies, efficiency in the level of lower-level government taxation can be achieved by a modifying version of a standard equalization grant formula.
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  • Christos Kotsogiannis, 2010. "Federal tax competition and the efficiency consequences for local taxation of revenue equalization," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(1), pages 1-14, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:17:y:2010:i:1:p:1-14
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-008-9094-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomas Sjögren, 2019. "Labor income taxes in an economic federation with proportional membership fees," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(5), pages 1137-1165, October.
    2. Willem Sas, 2017. "Can fiscal equalisation mitigate tax competition? Ad valorem and residence-based taxation in a federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(5), pages 817-853, September.
    3. Yuya Kikuchi & Toshiki Tamai, 2019. "Tax competition, unemployment, and intergovernmental transfers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 26(4), pages 899-918, August.
    4. Willem Sas, 2015. "Commuting in a federation: Horizontal and vertical tax externalities revisited," ERSA conference papers ersa15p690, European Regional Science Association.
    5. Ana B. Ania & Andreas Wagener, 2021. "Laboratory federalism with public funds sharing," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1047-1065, July.
    6. Mutsumi Matsumoto, 2022. "Tax competition and tax base equalization in the presence of multiple tax instruments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(5), pages 1213-1226, October.
    7. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Lopes da Fonseca, Mariana, 2013. "The economics and empirics of tax competition: A survey," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 163, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    8. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Cristian Sepulveda, 2012. "Toward a More General Theory of Revenue Assignments," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1231, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    9. Grazzini Lisa & Petretto Alessandro, 2022. "Heterogeneous capital tax competition in a federation with asymmetric tax compliance," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 23(4), pages 669-705, December.
    10. Christian Kelders & Marko Koethenbuerger, 2010. "Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(2), pages 683-703, May.
    11. Haraguchi Junichi & Ogawa Hikaru, 2018. "Leadership in Tax Competition with Fiscal Equalization Transfers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 1-15, July.
    12. Sotiris Karkalakos & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2007. "A spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses: evidence from Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(3), pages 782-811, August.
    13. William H. Hoyt, 2017. "The assignment and division of the tax base in a system of hierarchical governments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(4), pages 678-704, August.
    14. Ogawa, Hikaru & Wang, Wenming, 2016. "Asymmetric tax competition and fiscal equalization in a repeated game setting," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-10.
    15. Audun Langørgen, 2015. "A structural approach for analyzing fiscal equalization," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(3), pages 376-400, June.
    16. Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, 2012. "International Tax Competition and Coordination," Working Papers international_tax_competi, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    17. Caterina Liesegang & Marco Runkel, 2018. "Tax competition and fiscal equalization under corporate income taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 311-324, April.
    18. Till Gross, 2021. "Dynamic Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Transfer Union," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 42, pages 194-238, October.
    19. Mutsumi Matsumoto & Hikaru Ogawa, 2022. "Tax Competition and Efficient Fiscal Transfers under Capital and Labor Income Taxes," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1196, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    20. Carmela Brugnano & Giuseppe Ferraina & Andrea Ferri & Larysa Minzyuk & Felice Russo, 2017. "Federalismo municipale e nuovo sistema perequativo: il Fondo di solidariet? comunale 2016," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2017(2), pages 93-133.
    21. Mutsumi Matsumoto & Hikaru Ogawa, 2023. "Corporate income tax competition and efficient tax base equalization," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 109-118, March.
    22. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Cristian Sepulveda, 2020. "A Theoretical Rationale for the Fiscal-Gap Model of Equalization Transfers," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 76(1), pages 1-28.
    23. Ana B. Ania & Andreas Wagener, 2021. "Laboratory federalism with public funds sharing," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1047-1065, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal tax competition; Fiscal externalities; Equalization grants; H41; H71; H77;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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