Do Medicare Advantage enrollees tend to be admitted to hospitals with better or worse outcomes compared with fee-for-service enrollees?
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DOI: 10.1007/s10754-010-9076-0
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Medicare Advantage; Hospital mortality rates; Patient safety; I11; I18;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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