Credit policy, real exchange rate volatility and moral hazard

We extend the well-developed theoretical literature on unconventional credit policy from a closed economy to a small open economy. Consistent with the literature, we find that credit policy has positive effects on output and consumption by raising investment demand. In terms of expanding output, it is more effective to extend government credit to banks than to the goods-producing sector because for each unit of credit supplied to banks, banks - through leverage - can supply greater than one unit of intermediation to firms. We find the welfare implications are ambiguous and depend on the type of policy chosen. A policy of providing funds to goods-producing firms tends to be welfare-improving because it dampens the responses of all variables after a negative shock, including the real exchange rate. However, providing government assistance to the banking sector may be a costly policy because it encourages greater risk-taking on part of banks, leading to higher bank leverage. All else equal, this increases the volatility of the economy, raising the variances of consumption and of the real exchange rate, which is welfare-deteriorating. We interpret this as indicative of the problem of moral hazard associated with a policy of providing support to failing banks.