More than words: the effects of cheap talk in a volunteer’s dilemma
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9442-3
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez & Javier Rodero Cosano, 2021. "Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 235-263, September.
- Chloé Coq & Henrik Orzen & Sebastian Schwenen, 2017.
"Pricing and capacity provision in electricity markets: an experimental study,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 123-158, April.
- Le Coq, Chloé & Orzen, Henrik & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2016. "Pricing and Capacity Provision in Electricity Markets: An Experimental Study," SITE Working Paper Series 37, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
- Campos-Mercade, Pol, 2021.
"The volunteer’s dilemma explains the bystander effect,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 646-661.
- Pol Campos-Mercade, 2020. "The Volunteer’s Dilemma explains the Bystander Effect," CEBI working paper series 20-27, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. The Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI).
- Patel, Amrish & Smith, Alec, 2019. "Guilt and participation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 279-295.
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More about this item
Keywords
Volunteer’s dilemma; Cheap talk; Coordination;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
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