Voluntary Participation in International Environmental Agreements and Authority Structures in a Federation: A Note
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-021-00550-4
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More about this item
Keywords
Delegation; International environmental agreements; Nash bargaining; Negotiation; Participation; Public goods;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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