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The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying Contests

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  • Tim Friehe

Abstract

This paper establishes that a lobbying stage following investment decisions regarding abatement technology may imply a positive strategic effect of investment, pointing to relatively more investment in pollution abatement technologies than without lobbying. The intuition is that polluting firms may choose to implement more advanced abatement technology as a credible commitment device in order to lower the investment of environmentalists in the lobbying contest that will ultimately determine whether or not an emissions tax is introduced. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Friehe, 2013. "The Role of Investment in Environmental Lobbying Contests," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(3), pages 337-352, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:56:y:2013:i:3:p:337-352
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9650-2
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    Cited by:

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    2. Daniel Cardona & Jenny De Freitas & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2021. "Environmental policy contests: command and control versus taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 28(3), pages 654-684, June.
    3. Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Stathopoulou, Eleni & Munoz, Felix, 2019. "Regulators and Environmental Groups: Substitutes or Complements?," Working Papers 2019-1, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    4. Eleni Stathopoulou & Luis Gautier, 2019. "Green Alliances and the Role of Taxation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(3), pages 1189-1206, November.
    5. Daniel Cardona & Jenny De Freitas & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2018. "Polarization or Moderation? Intra-group heterogeneity in endogenous-policy contest," DEA Working Papers 87, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Technology choice; Pollution control; Lobbying ; Contest; H23; Q58;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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