Multi-Sector Model of Tradable Emission Permits
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-011-9488-4
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Cited by:
- Makoto Tanaka and Yihsu Chen, 2012. "Emissions Trading in Forward and Spot Markets for Electricity," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
- Chen, Yihsu & Tanaka, Makoto, 2018. "Permit banking in emission trading: Competition, arbitrage and linkage," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 70-82.
- Conor Devitt & Richard Tol, 2012. "Oligopoly and Oligopsony Power in the Swedish Market," Working Paper Series 3212, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
- Song Jiang & Shuang Qiu & Hong Zhou & Meilan Chen, 2019. "Can FinTech Development Curb Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution?," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(22), pages 1-22, November.
- Yuyu Li & Bo Huang & Fengming Tao, 2016. "Pricing Mechanism Design for Centralized Pollutant Treatment with SME Alliances," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
Tradable emission permits; Initial allocation; Multi-sector model; Cournot oligopoly; Market power; Q58; L51;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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