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Abstract rules for complex systems

Author

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  • Mario J. Rizzo

    (New York University)

Abstract

This article addresses the question—What is the structure of rules required to undergird a complex dynamic system of actions such as the market economy? The idea of simplicity does not adequately highlight the particular characteristics that the rules must possess. Instead, this article explores the key requirement of abstractness. This is a multifaceted concept. It manifests itself in the abstract formulation of the antecedent clause in rules, and in ends-independence, decomposability, and generality. These requirements do not directly influence the size or scope of the state but they may indirectly do so by precluding certain forms of intervention.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario J. Rizzo, 2021. "Abstract rules for complex systems," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 209-227, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:52:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-020-09679-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-020-09679-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henry E. Smith, 2019. "Complexity and the Cathedral: making law and economics more Calabresian," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 43-63, August.
    2. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325.
    3. Kaplow, Louis, 1995. "A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 150-163, April.
    4. Rizzo Mario J., 1999. "Which Kind of Legal Order? Logical Coherence and Praxeological Coherence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 9(4), pages 1-16, December.
    5. Douglas Whitman, 2009. "The rules of abstraction," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(1), pages 21-41, March.
    6. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 1998. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521621878.
    7. Fon, Vincy & Parisi, Francesco, 2007. "On the optimal specificity of legal rules," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 147-164, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rules; Abstractness; Complexity; Stability; Predictability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • P10 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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