IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/ecopln/v40y2007i3p207-221.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Make or buy on the Russian railway? Coase, Williamson, and Tsar Nicholas II

Author

Listed:
  • Russell Pittman

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell Pittman, 2007. "Make or buy on the Russian railway? Coase, Williamson, and Tsar Nicholas II," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 207-221, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:40:y:2007:i:3:p:207-221
    DOI: 10.1007/s10644-007-9024-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10644-007-9024-2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10644-007-9024-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ivaldi Marc & Mccullough Gerard, 2008. "Subadditivity Tests for Network Separation with an Application to U.S. Railroads," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-13, March.
    2. Joskow, Paul L, 1991. "The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 53-83, Special I.
    3. Dahlman, Carl J, 1979. "The Problem of Externality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 141-162, April.
    4. Victor S. Clark, 1908. "Australian Economic Problems. I. The Railways," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 22(3), pages 399-451.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    6. Crémer, Jacques & Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe, 2006. "Legal vs Ownership Unbundling in Network Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 5767, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Russell Pittman & Oana Diaconu & Emanual Šip & Anna Tomová & Jerzy Wronka, 2007. "Will the Train Ever Leave the Station? The Private Provision of Freight Railway Service in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe," EAG Discussions Papers 200705, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    8. Janusz A. Ordover & Russell W. Pittman & Paul Clyde, 1994. "Competition policy for natural monopolies in a developing market economy1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 2(3), pages 317-343, September.
    9. Christian Growitsch & Heike Wetzel, 2006. "Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis," Working Paper Series in Economics 29, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
    10. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev & Russell Pittman & Elizaveta Shevyakhova & Anna Tomová, 2006. "Railroad Restructuring in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe: One Solution for All Problems?," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 251-271, August.
    11. Bénédicte Vidaillet & V. d'Estaintot & P. Abécassis, 2005. "Introduction," Post-Print hal-00287137, HAL.
    12. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    13. José A. Gómez-Ibáñez & Ginés de Rus (ed.), 2006. "Competition in the Railway Industry," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 4213.
    14. S. Avdasheva., 2004. "Business-groups in Russian industries," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 5.
    15. Janusz Ordover & Russell Pittman & Paul Clyde, 2001. "Competition Policy for Natural Monopolies in a Developing Market Economy," Industrial Organization 0111004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mizutani, Fumitoshi & Uranishi, Shuji, 2020. "An analysis of the inter-effect of structural reforms and rail mode share," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. Thomas Ehrmann & Karl-Hans Hartwig & Torsten Marner & Hendrik Schmale, 2009. "Specific Investments and Ownership Structures in Railways – An Experimental Analysis," Working Papers 12, Institute of Transport Economics, University of Muenster.
    3. Benjamin Pakula & Georg Götz, 2011. "Organisational Structures in Network Industries – An Application to the Railway Industry," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201109, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    4. Pittman, Russell, 2011. "Risk-averse restructuring of freight railways in China," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 152-160.
    5. Pittman, Russell, 2016. "Reforming and Restructuring Ukrzaliznytsia: A Crucial Task for Ukrainian Reformers," MPRA Paper 76028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Elżbieta Szaruga & Elżbieta Załoga & Arkadiusz Drewnowski & Paulina Dąbrosz-Drewnowska, 2023. "Convergence of Energy Intensity of the Export of Goods by Rail Transport: Linkages with the Spatial Integration and Economic Condition of Countries," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(9), pages 1-24, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pittman, Russell, 2011. "Risk-averse restructuring of freight railways in China," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 152-160.
    2. Pittman, Russell, 2007. "Options for Restructuring the State-Owned Monopoly Railway," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 179-198, January.
    3. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    4. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 306-314, May.
    5. Isabelle Brocas, 2005. "Multistage Contracting with Applications to R&D and Insurance Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 317-346, May.
    6. Anjana Susarla & Anitesh Barua, 2011. "Contracting Efficiency and New Firm Survival in Markets Enabled by Information Technology," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 22(2), pages 306-324, June.
    7. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2010. "Monopolistic screening under learning by doing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 574-597, September.
    8. Garrett, Daniel F., 2020. "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," TSE Working Papers 20-1140, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    9. Roland Strausz, 2009. "Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 2638, CESifo.
    10. Slim Ben Youssef, 2010. "Adoption of a cleaner technology by a monopoly under incomplete information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 734-743.
    11. Adler, Nicole & Forsyth, Peter & Mueller, Juergen & Niemeier, Hans-Martin, 2015. "An economic assessment of airport incentive regulation," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 5-15.
    12. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jerome, 2004. "The subsidiarity bias in regulation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 255-283, January.
    13. Axel Gautier & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2013. "Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device. An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 4(1).
    14. Yvrande-Billon, Anne & Menard, Claude, 2005. "Institutional constraints and organizational changes: the case of the British rail reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 675-699, April.
    15. Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Unionized Labor Market and Regulation of Monopoly," MPRA Paper 17279, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2020. "Push or pull? Performance‐pay, incentives, and information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 301-317, March.
    17. G. Dionne & N. Doherty & N. Fombaron, 2000. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," THEMA Working Papers 2000-21, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    18. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2003. "Enforcement, Regulation and Development," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 12(Supplemen), pages 193-211, September.
    19. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-537, May.
    20. Quintero Jaramillo, Jose E., 2004. "Liquidity constraints and credit subsidies in auctions," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb040604, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public utilities; Restructuring; Vertical separation; Transactions cost economics; Railways; Russia; D23; L14; L22; L43; L51; L90; L92; N74;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
    • N74 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Europe: 1913-

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:40:y:2007:i:3:p:207-221. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.