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Term-limit evasions and the non-compliance cycle

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  • Zachary Elkins

    (University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

Executive term limits are evidently under stress in many jurisdictions. One mode in which they are evaded is through the formal revision or abrogation of a constitution. Such a process accelerates a pernicious cycle in which constitutional non-compliance begets constitutional instability, which in turn begets subsequent non-compliance. Such a non-compliance cycle is a core problem in law, and one that deserves more careful examination in various domains. This essay unearths original historical evidence of term-limit provisions and executive tenure in an effort to illuminate and evaluate the phenomenon. A background concern is that of international (and domestic) approaches to term-limit evasion. One intellectual response is that of militant democracy. The logic of that approach would imply the entrenchment and protection of term limits, which would presumably disrupt the cycle of non-compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Zachary Elkins, 2021. "Term-limit evasions and the non-compliance cycle," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 326-345, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:32:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09332-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09332-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Loewenstein, Karl, 1937. "Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, II," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 638-658, August.
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    3. Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
    4. Loewenstein, Karl, 1937. "Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 417-432, June.
    5. Anonymous, 1952. "Foreign Relations of the United States; Diplomatic Papers, 1934. Volume I, General; The British Commonwealth. Compiled By the U. S. Department of State. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office. ," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 267-267, March.
    6. Peter Ordeshook, 1992. "Constitutional stability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-175, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Monika Nalepa & Emilia Justyna Powell, 2021. "Fragile democracies and constitutional crises: a laboratory for studying the role of constitutional constraints," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 273-277, September.

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