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Institutions and Armed Forces

In: Defense Economics

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  • Marcus Matthias Keupp

    (Military Academy)

Abstract

In the age of nation states, the creation of any armed force is a political act. Prior to this age, private initiative spontaneously created armed forces to satisfy a short-term demand for military force and disbanded them once they had accomplished their mission. Today, those who have political power in the state create a (or maintain an existing) armed forces organization that exists as such. Without this institutional legitimization, armed forces could not emerge or continue to exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcus Matthias Keupp, 2021. "Institutions and Armed Forces," Springer Books, in: Defense Economics, chapter 0, pages 23-65, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-73815-0_2
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-73815-0_2
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