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The constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments: a study of open and limited access

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  • Louis Corriveau

    (Université de Moncton)

Abstract

I expound a game theoretical model of the constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments. For all parameter values, the game has open access equilibriums, where patronage does not occur. For some parameter values, it has also a limited access equilibrium, where patronage does occur. I prove open and limited access equilibriums are not Pareto-comparable to one another. Defining social welfare in utilitarian terms, I prove also that social welfare is maximised in a particular open access equilibrium, but that a limited access equilibrium can be a second-best solution, when it exists.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Corriveau, 2018. "The constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments: a study of open and limited access," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 268-280, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:29:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-018-9266-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9266-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patron; Client; Patronage; Clientelism; Nepotism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • P47 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Performance and Prospects
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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