Loss of control: legislature changes and the state–local relationship
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-014-9174-y
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More about this item
Keywords
Logroll; Special legislation; General legislation; Constitutional change; Apportionment; D72; H7; N4;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
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