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Advance notice of real-time electricity prices

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  • Thomas Taylor
  • Peter Schwarz

Abstract

Many utilities are offering real-time pricing (RTP) to their large industrial customers. Under RTP, hourly rates change with real-time supply and demand. As compared to fixed rates, RTP shifts price risk from the utility to the customer. With such a change, it is natural to ask if there is an optimal level of advance notice of prices. This paper contains a simulation of real-time rates for industrial customers with and without advance notice of prices. Advance notice is valuable to customers who can increase elasticity of substitution. This value must be weighed against the cost to the electric utility from an increase in demand forecast error. The simulation suggests that day-ahead advance notice increases welfare for reasonable magnitudes of customer elasticity and utility forecast error. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Taylor & Peter Schwarz, 2000. "Advance notice of real-time electricity prices," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 28(4), pages 478-488, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:28:y:2000:i:4:p:478-488
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02298399
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
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    3. Herriges, Joseph A, et al, 1993. "The Response of Industrial Customers to Electric Rates Based upon Dynamic Marginal Costs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(3), pages 446-454, August.
    4. Wen, Shiow-Ying & Tschirhart, John, 1997. "Non Utility Power, Alternative Regulatory Regimes and Stranded Investment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 291-310, November.
    5. Mak, Juliet C. & Chapman, Bruce R., 1993. "A survey of current real-time pricing programs," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 6(7), pages 76-77.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pascal Courty & Mario Pagliero, 2011. "Does responsive pricing smooth demand shocks?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(30), pages 4707-4721.
    2. James Cochell & Peter Schwarz & Thomas Taylor, 2012. "Using real-time electricity data to estimate response to time-of-use and flat rates: an application to emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 135-158, October.
    3. Dupont, B. & De Jonghe, C. & Olmos, L. & Belmans, R., 2014. "Demand response with locational dynamic pricing to support the integration of renewables," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 344-354.

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