How the City Air Made Us Free: The Self-Governing Medieval City and the Bourgeois Revaluation
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- Alexander W. Craig & Nathan Goodman, 2019. "Social Capital and Social Justice: Why Liberalism Is Essential," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Spring 20), pages 59-73.
- Jamie Bologna Pavlik & Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The legacy of representation in medieval Europe for incomes and institutions today," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(1), pages 414-448, July.
- Andrew T. Young, 2021. "The political economy of feudalism in medieval Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 127-143, March.
- Zachary Jacob Gochenour & Chris Fleming, 2019. "Self-Government, Political Economy, and the Christian Tradition," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Winter 20), pages 33-53.
- Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2018. "Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 171-192, June.
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Keywords
Great Enrichment; constitutions; institutions; medieval city; Bourgeois Revaluation; polycentric sovereignty;All these keywords.
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