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The Federal Reserve System's Overreach into Credit Allocation

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  • Lawrence H. White

    (George Mason University)

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  • Lawrence H. White, 2015. "The Federal Reserve System's Overreach into Credit Allocation," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 30(Winter 20), pages 17-29.
    • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1220
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Robert A. Eisenbeis, 1990. "Restructuring Banking," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 18-21, January.
    3. Thomas F. Cargill & Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr., 2013. "Federal Reserve Independence: Reality or Myth?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 33(3), pages 417-435, Fall.
    4. Thomas M. Humphrey, 2010. "Lender of Last Resort: What It Is, Whence It Came, and Why the Fed Isn't It," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 30(2), pages 333-364, Spring.
    5. Marvin Goodfriend, 2001. "Why we need an \\"accord\\" for Federal Reserve credit policy : a note," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 23-32.
    6. Lawrence H. White, 2013. "Antifragile Banking and Monetary Systems," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 33(3), pages 474-484, Fall.
    7. Henry W. Chappell Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor, 2000. "A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(4), pages 906-922, April.
    8. Selgin, George & Lastrapes, William D. & White, Lawrence H., 2012. "Has the Fed been a failure?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 569-596.
    9. Lawrence H. White, 2011. "A Gold Standard with Free Banking Would Have Restrained the Boom and Bust," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 31(3), pages 497-504, Fall.
    10. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1994. "Why We Need an "Accord" for Federal Reserve Credit Policy: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 572-580, August.
    11. White, Lawrence H., 2015. "The merits and feasibility of returning to a commodity standard," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 59-64.
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    Cited by:

    1. Salter, Alexander W. & Smith, Daniel J., 2019. "Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    2. William N. Butos, 2015. "The Bernanke Fed and "Credit Easing" Policies, 2008-2014," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 30(Winter 20), pages 1-15.

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