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Emergence and Collapse of the Norm of Resource Sharing Around Locally Abundant Resources

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Abstract

How do individuals resolve conflicts over resources? One way is to share resources, which is possible between known individuals, with the use of sanctions on free riders or by partner selection. Another way is for anonymous individuals to respect the finders’ ownership of resources based on asymmetry and avoid conflicts over resources. This study elucidates the conditions under which anonymous individuals share resources with each other irrespective of their asymmetry with regard to resources. High resource values inhibit anonymous individuals from sharing resources; however, small cumulative values and local distributions let anonymous individuals share the resources. Punishment of the richest individuals also supports resource sharing. These conditions may represent resource sharing among anonymous individuals in periods of great disasters and may be the origin of the practice of exchange in prehistoric times.

Suggested Citation

  • Shiro Horiuchi, 2015. "Emergence and Collapse of the Norm of Resource Sharing Around Locally Abundant Resources," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 18(4), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2015-28-3
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    3. Hisashi Ohtsuki & Yoh Iwasa & Martin A. Nowak, 2009. "Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment," Nature, Nature, vol. 457(7225), pages 79-82, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Cordes & Wolfram Elsner & Claudius Graebner & Torsten Heinrich & Joshua Henkel & Henning Schwardt & Georg Schwesinger & Tong-Yaa Su, 2021. "The collapse of cooperation: the endogeneity of institutional break-up and its asymmetry with emergence," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 1291-1315, September.
    2. Shiro Horiuchi, 2021. "Bridging of different sites by bohemians and tourists: analysis by agent-based simulation," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 567-584, November.
    3. Nick Harkiolakis, 2023. "The Cycle of Value The Cycle of Value -- A Conservationist Approach to Economics," Papers 2308.07185, arXiv.org.

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