IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/jas/jasssj/2007-75-2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Micro- and Macro-Level Validation in Agent-Based Simulation: Reproduction of Human-Like Behaviors and Thinking in a Sequential Bargaining Game

Author

Listed:

Abstract

This paper addresses both micro- and macro-level validation in agent-based simulation (ABS) to explore validated agents that can reproduce not only human-like behaviors externally but also human-like thinking internally. For this purpose, we employ the sequential bargaining game, which can investigate a change in humans' behaviors and thinking longer than the ultimatum game (i.e., one-time bargaining game), and compare simulation results of Q-learning agents employing any type of the three types of action selections (i.e., the ε-greedy, roulette, and Boltzmann distribution selections) in the game. Intensive simulations have revealed the following implications: (1) Q-learning agents with any type of three action selections can reproduce human-like behaviors but not human-like thinking, which means that they are validated from the macro-level viewpoint but not from the micro-level viewpoint; and (2) Q-learning agents employing Boltzmann distribution selection with changing the random parameter can reproduce both human-like behaviors and thinking, which means that they are validated from both micro- and macro-level viewpoints.

Suggested Citation

  • Keiki Takadama & Tetsuro Kawai & Yuhsuke Koyama, 2008. "Micro- and Macro-Level Validation in Agent-Based Simulation: Reproduction of Human-Like Behaviors and Thinking in a Sequential Bargaining Game," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 11(2), pages 1-9.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2007-75-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.jasss.org/11/2/9/9.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. David Hales & Juliette Rouchier & Bruce Edmonds, 2003. "Model-to-Model Analysis," Post-Print halshs-00550488, HAL.
    3. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
    4. Abhinay Muthoo, 2000. "A Non-technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory," World Economics, World Economics, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 1(2), pages 145-166, April.
    5. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, January.
    6. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
    7. Nigel Gilbert, 2004. "Open Problems In Using Agent-Based Models In Industrial And Labor Dynamics," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(02), pages 285-288.
    8. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-1095, December.
    9. David Hales & Juliette Rouchier & Bruce Edmonds, 2003. "Model-To-Model Analysis," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 6(4), pages 1-5.
    10. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
    11. Robert Axtell & Robert Axelrod & Joshua M. Epstein & Michael D. Cohen, 1995. "Aligning Simulation Models: A Case Study and Results," Working Papers 95-07-065, Santa Fe Institute.
    12. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, April.
    13. Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christopher J. Lynch & Erik J. Jensen & Virginia Zamponi & Kevin O’Brien & Erika Frydenlund & Ross Gore, 2023. "A Structured Narrative Prompt for Prompting Narratives from Large Language Models: Sentiment Assessment of ChatGPT-Generated Narratives and Real Tweets," Future Internet, MDPI, vol. 15(12), pages 1-36, November.
    2. Johannes Dahlke & Kristina Bogner & Matthias Mueller & Thomas Berger & Andreas Pyka & Bernd Ebersberger, 2020. "Is the Juice Worth the Squeeze? Machine Learning (ML) In and For Agent-Based Modelling (ABM)," Papers 2003.11985, arXiv.org.
    3. Yu Zhang & Jason Leezer, 2010. "Simulating human-like decisions in a memory-based agent model," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 373-399, December.
    4. Shim Jaehu & Bliemel Martin, 2018. "Ignition of New Product Diffusion in Entrepreneurship: An Agent-Based Approach," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-17, March.
    5. Breig, Roman & Coblenz, Maximilian & Pelz, Michael, 2018. "Enhancing simulation-based theory development in entrepreneurship through statistical validation," Journal of Business Venturing Insights, Elsevier, vol. 9(C), pages 53-59.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Paola Tubaro, 2011. "Computational Economics," Chapters, in: John B. Davis & D. Wade Hands (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Uri Wilensky & William Rand, 2007. "Making Models Match: Replicating an Agent-Based Model," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 10(4), pages 1-2.
    3. Larry Samuelson, 2016. "Game Theory in Economics and Beyond," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(4), pages 107-130, Fall.
    4. Camiña, Ester & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2009. "The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-92, January.
    5. Günter Küppers & Johannes Lenhard, 2005. "Validation of Simulation: Patterns in the Social and Natural Sciences," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 8(4), pages 1-3.
    6. Venkat Venkatasubramanian & Yu Luo, 2018. "How much income inequality is fair? Nash bargaining solution and its connection to entropy," Papers 1806.05262, arXiv.org.
    7. Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. van Damme, Eric & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Roth, Alvin E. & Samuelson, Larry & Winter, Eyal & Bolton, Gary E. & Ockenfels, Axel & Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Gneezy, Uri & Kocher, Martin G, 2014. "How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 292-318.
    9. Alan Kirman & Sonia Moulet, 2008. "Impact de l'organisation du marché: Comparaison de la négociation de gré à gré et des enchères descendantes," Working Papers halshs-00349034, HAL.
    10. Hanato, Shunsuke, 2019. "Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 361-379.
    11. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    12. Grosskopf, Brit & Roth, Alvin E., 2009. "If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 176-204, January.
    13. Robert Slonim & Alvin E Roth, 2010. "Learning in High stakes utlimatum and market games. An experiment in the Slovak Republic," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1718, David K. Levine.
    14. Yuya Ushida & Kiyohiko Hattori & Keiki Takdama, 2010. "Modeling collective adaptive agent design and its analysis in Barnga game," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 5(2), pages 137-154, December.
    15. James Andreoni & Marco Castillo & Ragan Petrie, 2009. "Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 25, pages 35-63.
    16. Chin, Ming-Chin & Weaver, Robert D., 2004. "Forward Contracting Specification Through Collective Bargaining," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20006, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    17. Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2020. "Using experiments to compare the predictive power of models of multilateral negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    18. Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, 2010. "A Methodology for Complex Social Simulations," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 13(1), pages 1-7.
    19. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    20. Allan Collard-Wexler & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Robin S. Lee, 2019. ""Nash-in-Nash" Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 163-195.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2007-75-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Francesco Renzini (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.