IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/iza/izawol/journly2015n213.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Measuring disincentives to formal work

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Weber

    (World Bank, USA)

Abstract

Evidence from transition economies shows that formal work may not pay, particularly for low-wage earners. Synthetic measurements of work disincentives, such as the formalization tax rate or the marginal effective tax rate, confirm a significant positive correlation between these measurements and the probability of informal work. These measures are especially informative for impacts at lower wage levels, where informality is highest. Policymakers who want to increase formal work can use these measurements to determine optimal labor taxation rates for low-wage earners and reform benefit design.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Weber, 2015. "Measuring disincentives to formal work," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 213-213, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izawol:journl:y:2015:n:213
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://wol.iza.org/articles/measuring-disincentives-to-formal-work-1.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://wol.iza.org/articles/measuring-disincentives-to-formal-work
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Immervoll, Herwig & Pearson, Mark, 2009. "A Good Time for Making Work Pay? Taking Stock of In-Work Benefits and Related Measures across the OECD," IZA Policy Papers 3, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Frolich, Markus & Kaplan, David & Pages, Carmen & Rigolini, Jamele & Robalino, David (ed.), 2014. "Social Insurance, Informality, and Labor Markets: How to Protect Workers While Creating Good Jobs," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199685233.
    3. Koettl, Johannes & Weber, Michael, 2012. "Does Formal Work Pay? The Role of Labor Taxation and Social Benefit Design in the New EU Member States," IZA Discussion Papers 6313, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Hazans, Mihails, 2011. "Informal Workers across Europe: Evidence from 30 Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 5871, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Lawrance, Emily C, 1991. "Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 54-77, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Xavier Jara & David Rodríguez, 2019. "Financial disincentives to formal work: Evidence from Ecuador and Colombia," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2019-14, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. H. Xavier Jara & María Cecilia Deza Delgado & Nicolás Oliva & Javier Torres, 2023. "Financial disincentives to formal employment and tax-benefit systems in Latin America," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(1), pages 69-113, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Koettl, Johannes & Weber, Michael, 2012. "Does Formal Work Pay? The Role of Labor Taxation and Social Benefit Design in the New EU Member States," IZA Discussion Papers 6313, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Ranđelović Saša & Žarković Rakić Jelena & Vladisavljević Marko & Vujić Sunčica, 2019. "Labour Supply and Inequality Effects of In-Work Benefits: Evidence from Serbia," Naše gospodarstvo/Our economy, Sciendo, vol. 65(3), pages 1-22, September.
    3. Indermit Gill & Johannes Koettl & Truman Packard, 2013. "Full employment: a distant dream for Europe," IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 2(1), pages 1-34, December.
    4. Richard M. H. Suen, 2014. "Time Preference And The Distributions Of Wealth And Income," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 364-381, January.
    5. Marieka M. Klawitter & C. Leigh Anderson & Mary Kay Gugerty, 2013. "Savings And Personal Discount Rates In A Matched Savings Program For Low-Income Families," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 468-485, July.
    6. Thomas J. Kniesner & James P. Ziliak, 2002. "Tax Reform and Automatic Stabilization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 590-612, June.
    7. Harashima, Taiji, 2017. "Should a Government Fiscally Intervene in a Recession and, If So, How?," MPRA Paper 78053, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Kartik Athreya & José Mustre-del-Río & Juan M Sánchez, 2019. "The Persistence of Financial Distress," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(10), pages 3851-3883.
    9. James P. Ziliak, 2003. "Income Transfers and Assets of the Poor," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(1), pages 63-76, February.
    10. Tia Palermo & Sudhanshu Handa & Amber Peterman & Leah Prencipe & David Seidenfeld, 2016. "Unconditional government social cash transfer in Africa does not increase fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 29(4), pages 1083-1111, October.
    11. William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, 2000. "Entrepreneurship and Household Saving," NBER Working Papers 7894, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Orlando Gomes, 2008. "Time Preference and Cyclical Endogenous Growth in an AK Growth Model," Notas Económicas, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra, issue 28, pages 32-55, December.
    13. Meier, Stephan & Sprenger, Charles, 2010. "Stability of Time Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 4756, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Burlinson, Andrew & Giulietti, Monica & Law, Cherry & Liu, Hui-Hsuan, 2021. "Fuel poverty and financial distress," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    15. Bohdan Kukharskyy & Michael Pflüger, 2011. "Relational Contracts and the Economic Well-Being of Nations," Working Papers 095, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    16. Åsa Johansson, 2016. "Public Finance, Economic Growth and Inequality: A Survey of the Evidence," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1346, OECD Publishing.
    17. Spears Dean, 2011. "Economic Decision-Making in Poverty Depletes Behavioral Control," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-44, December.
    18. Herwig Immervoll & Stefano Scarpetta, 2012. "Activation and employment support policies in OECD countries. An overview of current approaches," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, December.
    19. Rubio, Margarita, 2014. "Housing-market heterogeneity in a monetary union," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 163-184.
    20. Maya Eden, 2023. "The Cross‐Sectional Implications of the Social Discount Rate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(6), pages 2065-2088, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    informal employment; synthetic measurements; tax wedge; tax evasion; formalization tax rate; marginal effective tax rate;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izawol:journl:y:2015:n:213. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/izaaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.