IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ioe/cuadec/v36y1999i108p761-779.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ajuste de las Primas por Factores de Riesgo en los Planes de Salud de las ISAPRES

Author

Listed:
  • Arístides Torche

    (Instituto de Economía)

  • Carlos Williamson

Abstract

This paper analyzes the premium charged by the private Chilean health insurance market, constituted by the private health management institutions, ISAPRES. A relationship between the expected expenditure and the socio-demographic variables, sex, age and t

Suggested Citation

  • Arístides Torche & Carlos Williamson, 1999. "Ajuste de las Primas por Factores de Riesgo en los Planes de Salud de las ISAPRES," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 36(108), pages 761-779.
  • Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:36:y:1999:i:108:p:761-779
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/108torca.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1998. "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 1, pages 1-32, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
    2. David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan & Joseph P. Newhouse, 1998. "Prices and Productivity in Managed Care Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6677, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Belli, Paolo, 2001. "How adverse selection affects the health insurance market," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2574, The World Bank.
    4. Feldman, Roger & Dowd, Bryan, 2000. "Risk segmentation: goal or problem?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 499-512, July.
    5. Jack, William, 2001. "Controlling selection incentives when health insurance contracts are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 25-48, April.
    6. Selden, Thomas M., 1999. "Premium subsidies for health insurance: excessive coverage vs. adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 709-725, December.
    7. Kyoungrae Jung, 2010. "Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure of Quality Information in HMO Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 183-210, March.
    8. Karen Eggleston & Anupa Bir, 2009. "Measuring Selection Incentives in Managed Care: Evidence From the Massachusetts State Employee Insurance Program," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 159-175, March.
    9. Bowblis John R. & Brunt Christopher S. & Grabowski David C., 2016. "Competitive Spillovers and Regulatory Exploitation by Skilled Nursing Facilities," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 45-70, June.
    10. Lise Rochaix, 2004. "Les modes de rémunération des médecins," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 76(3), pages 223-239.
    11. Allen C. Goodman & Miron Stano, 2000. "Hmos and Health Externalities: A Local Public Good Perspective," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(3), pages 247-269, May.
    12. Aouad, Marion, 2021. "An Examination of the Intracorrelation of Family Health Insurance," IZA Discussion Papers 14541, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. repec:pri:cepsud:232rosen is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 419-443, May.
    15. Schmid, Christian P.R. & Beck, Konstantin, 2016. "Re-insurance in the Swiss health insurance market: Fit, power, and balance," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(7), pages 848-855.
    16. Darius Erlangga & Shehzad Ali & Karen Bloor, 2019. "The impact of public health insurance on healthcare utilisation in Indonesia: evidence from panel data," International Journal of Public Health, Springer;Swiss School of Public Health (SSPH+), vol. 64(4), pages 603-613, May.
    17. Ching‐To Albert Ma & Michael H. Riordan, 2002. "Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 81-107, March.
    18. Howell, Bronwyn, 2006. "Unveiling 'Invisible Hands': Two-Sided Platforms in Health Care Markets," Working Paper Series 18936, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    19. James M. Malcomson, 2005. "Supplier Discretion Over Provision: Theory and an Application to Medical Care," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 412-429, Summer.
    20. Hsiao, William C. & Yip, Winnie, 2024. "Financing and provision of healthcare for two billion people in low-income nations: Is the cooperative healthcare model a solution?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 345(C).
    21. Colleen Carey, 2017. "Technological Change and Risk Adjustment: Benefit Design Incentives in Medicare Part D," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 38-73, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Premium; health insurance; adverse selection; risk factors;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:36:y:1999:i:108:p:761-779. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jaime Casassus (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iepuccl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.