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Bargaining Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case

Author

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  • Kalyan Chatterjee

    (Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania)

  • Larry Samuelson

    (Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania)

Abstract

Chatterjee and Samuelson (Chatterjee, K., L. Samuelson. 1987. Bargaining with two-sided incomplete information: An infinite horizon model with alternating offers. Rev. Econ. Stud. 54 175–192.) recently examined a noncooperative game-theoretic bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information and an infinite horizon. Results were obtained from the model with the help of restrictions on agents' strategies. This paper examines the model without these restrictions. By doing so, we will gain some insight into whether these results are robust, in the sense that they do not depend upon the special structure of the model, and hence, might provide useful theoretical foundations for applied work. We find that the basic results generalize. As with the restricted model, we find an equilibrium in which bargaining will proceed for a finite but endogeneously determined number of stages. A terminal condition on the equilibrium sequence of agents' beliefs determines the properties of the equilibrium and allows comparative static results to be obtained. These include the finding that agents are more likely to capture a large share of the potential gains from bargaining if they exhibit characteristics that can be readily interpreted as giving them more bargaining power. Unlike the restricted model, this equilibrium is not unique, though we argue that it is plausible.

Suggested Citation

  • Kalyan Chatterjee & Larry Samuelson, 1988. "Bargaining Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(4), pages 605-618, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:36:y:1988:i:4:p:605-618
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.36.4.605
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Menezes, Flavio M., 1996. "Multiple-unit English auctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 671-684, December.
    2. Sambuddha Ghosh & Gabriele Gratton & Caixia Shen, 2019. "Intimidation: Linking Negotiation And Conflict," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1589-1618, November.
    3. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225, Elsevier.
    4. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2013. "Bargaining and War: A Review of Some Formal Models," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 29, pages 235-266.
    5. Bradley J Larsen, 2021. "The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 851-882.
    6. Anita Gantner, 2007. "Bargaining, Search, and Outside Options," Working Papers 2007-16, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    7. Stefan Kohler, 2012. "Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 3(3), pages 1-19, September.
    8. Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Våge Knutsen, Magnus, 2022. "The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 454-468.
    9. Feri, Francesco & Gantner, Anita, 2011. "Bargaining or searching for a better price? - An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 376-399, June.
    10. Calabuig, Vicent & Cunyat, Antoni & Olcina, Gonzalo, 2004. "Partially revocable commitments in a negotiation with a deadline," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(4), pages 371-380, December.
    11. Gantner, Anita, 2008. "Bargaining, search, and outside options," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 417-435, March.
    12. Dimitris Zissis & George Ioannou & Apostolos Burnetas, 2020. "Coordinating Lot Sizing Decisions Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(2), pages 371-387, February.
    13. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2006. "Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information," Economic Research Papers 269732, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    14. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 2012. "One-Sided Uncertainty And Delay In Reputational Bargaining," Working Papers 1430, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    15. Rami Zwick & Ching Chyi Lee, 1999. "Bargaining and Search: An Experimental Study," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 8(6), pages 463-487, November.
    16. Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & Roth, Stefan, 2009. "Delegated bargaining in distribution channels," Australasian marketing journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 133-141.
    17. Basak, Deepal, 2023. "Bargaining under almost complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    18. Yuval Heller, 2012. "Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 209-224, February.
    19. Sherry X. Sun & Jing Zhao & Sumit Sarkar, 2017. "How High Should We Go? Determining Reservation Values to Negotiate Successfully for Composite Software Services," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 353-377, June.
    20. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.

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