IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v66y2020i10p4573-4593.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Fast Should Trades Settle?

Author

Listed:
  • Mariana Khapko

    (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto Scarborough, Toronto, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada;)

  • Marius Zoican

    (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Mississauga, Mississauga, Ontario L5L 1C6, Canada)

Abstract

Recent regulatory and industry initiatives aim to streamline post-trade infrastructures. Does faster settlement benefit markets? We build a model of intermediated trading with imperfectly competitive securities lending. Faster settlement benefits impatient traders but increases borrowing needs. We find that flexible failure-to-deliver penalties reduce this tension, disciplining security lender competition and allowing for real-time settlement. Optimal penalties resemble put options on the lending market: they protect traders against high settlement costs but do not eliminate failures to deliver. Mandating automatic security borrowing to prevent failures to deliver triggers a toxic settlement rat race to lock in low borrowing costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariana Khapko & Marius Zoican, 2020. "How Fast Should Trades Settle?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4573-4593, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:10:p:4573-4593
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3408
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3408
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3408?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Chiu & Thorsten V Koeppl, 2019. "Blockchain-Based Settlement for Asset Trading," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(5), pages 1716-1753.
    2. Benos, Evangelos & Garratt, Rodney & Gurrola-Perez, Pedro, 2017. "The economics of distributed ledger technology for securities settlement," Bank of England working papers 670, Bank of England.
    3. Loon, Yee Cheng & Zhong, Zhaodong Ken, 2014. "The impact of central clearing on counterparty risk, liquidity, and trading: Evidence from the credit default swap market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 91-115.
    4. repec:bla:jfinan:v:43:y:1988:i:3:p:617-37 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Nathan Foley-Fisher & Stefan Gissler & Stephane Verani, 2019. "Over-the-Counter Market Liquidity and Securities Lending," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 272-294, July.
    6. Thierry Foucault & Ohad Kadan & Eugene Kandel, 2013. "Liquidity Cycles and Make/Take Fees in Electronic Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(1), pages 299-341, February.
    7. Léanne Berger-Soucy & Jean-Sébastien Fontaine & Adrian Walton, 2019. "Price Caps in Canadian Bond Borrowing Markets," Staff Analytical Notes 2019-2, Bank of Canada.
    8. Grossman, S.J. & Miller, M.H., 1988. "Liquidity And Market Structure," Papers 88, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
    9. Chague, Fernando & De-Losso, Rodrigo & De Genaro, Alan & Giovannetti, Bruno, 2017. "Well-connected short-sellers pay lower loan fees: A market-wide analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 646-670.
    10. Huszár, Zsuzsa R. & Simon, Zorka, 2018. "The pricing implications of the oligopolistic securities lending market: A beneficial owner perspective," SAFE Working Paper Series 215, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    11. Stephens, Eric & Thompson, James R., 2017. "Information asymmetry and risk transfer markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 88-99.
    12. Nathan Foley-Fisher & Stefan Gissler & Stephane Verani, 2019. "Over-the-Counter Market Liquidity and Securities Lending," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 33, pages 272-294, July.
    13. Fotak, Veljko & Raman, Vikas & Yadav, Pradeep K., 2014. "Fails-to-deliver, short selling, and market quality," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 493-516.
    14. Tobias Adrian & Brian Begalle & Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Repo and Securities Lending," NBER Chapters, in: Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling, pages 131-148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Geczy, Christopher C. & Musto, David K. & Reed, Adam V., 2002. "Stocks are special too: an analysis of the equity lending market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 241-269.
    16. Michael J. Fleming & Kenneth D. Garbade, 2005. "Explaining settlement fails," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 11(Sep).
    17. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    18. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    19. Duffie, Darrell, 1996. "Special Repo Rates," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(2), pages 493-526, June.
    20. Adam C. Kolasinski & Adam V. Reed & Matthew C. Ringgenberg, 2013. "A Multiple Lender Approach to Understanding Supply and Search in the Equity Lending Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(2), pages 559-595, April.
    21. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    22. Albert J Menkveld, 2017. "Crowded Positions: An Overlooked Systemic Risk for Central Clearing Parties," The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(2), pages 209-242.
    23. Jordan, Bradford D & Jordan, Susan D, 1997. "Special Repo Rates: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 2051-2072, December.
    24. Duffie, Darrell & Garleanu, Nicolae & Pedersen, Lasse Heje, 2002. "Securities lending, shorting, and pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2-3), pages 307-339.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Amini, Hamed & Bichuch, Maxim & Feinstein, Zachary, 2023. "Decentralized payment clearing using blockchain and optimal bidding," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 309(1), pages 409-420.
    2. Hans Degryse & Mark Van Achter & Gunther Wuyts, 2022. "Plumbing of Securities Markets: The Impact of Post-trade Fees on Trading and Welfare," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 635-653, January.
    3. Jakob Hackel & Wolfgang Haunold & Hannes Hermanky & Alfred Taudes, 2021. "Distributed ledger technologies for securities settlement – the case for running T2S on DLT," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q2/21, pages 13-33.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Corradin, Stefano & Maddaloni, Angela, 2020. "The importance of being special: Repo markets during the crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(2), pages 392-429.
    2. Pelizzon, Loriana & Riedel, Max & Simon, Zorka & Subrahmanyam, Marti G., 2020. "Collateral eligibility of corporate debt in the Eurosystem," SAFE Working Paper Series 275, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    3. Stefania D'Amico & Roger Fan & Yuriy Kitsul, 2013. "The Scarcity Value of Treasury Collateral: Repo Market Effects of Security-Specific Supply and Demand Factors," Working Paper Series WP-2013-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    4. Antonio Gargano & Juan Sotes-Paladino & Patrick Verwijmeren, 2022. "Out of Sync: Dispersed Short Selling and the Correction of Mispricing," Working Papers 108, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    5. Huszár, Zsuzsa R. & Simon, Zorka, 2018. "The pricing implications of the oligopolistic securities lending market: A beneficial owner perspective," SAFE Working Paper Series 215, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    6. Fleming, Michael J. & Garbade, Kenneth D., 2007. "Dealer behavior in the specials market for US Treasury securities," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 204-228, April.
    7. Buschmann, Christian & Schmaltz, Christian, 2017. "Sovereign collateral as a Trojan Horse: Why do we need an LCR+," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 311-330.
    8. Banerjee, Snehal & Graveline, Jeremy J., 2014. "Trading in derivatives when the underlying is scarce," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 589-608.
    9. Beneish, M.D. & Lee, C.M.C. & Nichols, D.C., 2015. "In short supply: Short-sellers and stock returns," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 33-57.
    10. Huszár, Zsuzsa R. & Prado, Melissa Porras, 2019. "An analysis of over-the-counter and centralized stock lending markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 31-53.
    11. Shunda, Nicholas, 2009. "Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 645-664, November.
    12. Arturo Bris & William N. Goetzmann & Ning Zhu, 2007. "Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1029-1079, June.
    13. Otto, Steven & Poe, Gregory L. & Just, David R., 2017. "Formulating and Testing a New Conservation Auction Mechanism in an Experimental Setting," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 258476, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    14. Walter Beckert, 2004. "Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0404, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    15. Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Zou, Liang, 2011. "Premium auctions and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2420-2439.
    16. Dixon, Peter N. & Fox, Corbin A. & Kelley, Eric K., 2021. "To own or not to own: Stock loans around dividend payments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 539-559.
    17. Nawar, Abdel-Hameed & Sen, Debapriya, 2018. "kth price auctions and Catalan numbers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 69-73.
    18. Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J., 2001. "Know thy enemies : knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions," Working papers 9, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    19. Condorelli, Daniele, 2013. "Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 582-591.
    20. Peter M. DeMarzo & Ilan Kremer & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2005. "Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 936-959, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:10:p:4573-4593. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.