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Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors

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  • Gerald J. Glasser

    (New York University)

Abstract

Game theory may be used to describe and to analyze corporate elections which are based upon a system of cumulative voting. In these games a strategy is a partition of one's votes among a slate of candidates. A minimax strategy is such a partition which guarantees a voter a certain security level in terms of the number of directorships he can win irrespective of how his opponents vote. These minimax strategies, although not so called, are equivalent to decision rules on how to vote found throughout the literature of business organization.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerald J. Glasser, 1959. "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 5(2), pages 151-156, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:5:y:1959:i:2:p:151-156
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.5.2.151
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Gergaud & Victor Ginsburgh & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2020. "Wine Ratings," Working Papers ECARES 2020-38, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2023. "Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 27-44, January.
    3. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Weber, Shlomo, 2022. "The measurement of the value of a language," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    4. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    5. Ginsburgh, Victor & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Weber, Shlomo, 2017. "Ranking languages in the European Union: Before and after Brexit," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 139-151.
    6. Gergaud, Olivier & Ginsburgh, Victor & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2021. "Wine Ratings: Seeking a Consensus among Tasters via Normalization, Approval, and Aggregation," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(3), pages 321-342, August.
    7. Antonin Macé, 2015. "Voting with Evaluations: When Should We Sum? What Should We Sum?," AMSE Working Papers 1544, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 29 Oct 2015.
    8. Karpov, A., 2012. "Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 10-25.
    9. Davide Grossi, 2021. "Lecture Notes on Voting Theory," Papers 2105.00216, arXiv.org.
    10. Algaba, Encarnación & Béal, Sylvain & Fragnelli, Vito & Llorca, Natividad & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquin, 2019. "Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    11. Casella, Alessandra & Guo, Jeffrey Da-Ren & Jiang, Michelle, 2023. "Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 133-155.
    12. Duane Cooper & Arthur Zillante, 2012. "A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 363-383, January.
    13. Altunbas, Y & Chakravarty, S P, 2000. "Proportional Representation in the Welsh Assembly," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 85-94, April.
    14. Antonin Macé, 2017. "Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting," Working Papers halshs-01222200, HAL.

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