Project Evaluation and Control in Decentralized Firms: Is Capital Rationing Always Optimal?
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DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.41.8.1404
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Cited by:
- Arya kumar srustidhar Chand & Amit R k, 2015. "Capital rationing under perfect information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 878-884.
- Li, Shu-Hsing & Balachandran, Kashi R., 1997. "Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 138-153, April.
- Habib, Michel A. & Johnsen, D. Bruce, 2016. "The quality-assuring role of mutual fund advisory fees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 1-19.
- Fadaei, Salman & Bichler, Martin, 2017. "Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: On the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(2), pages 767-777.
- Horan, Stephen M. & Johnsen, D. Bruce, 2008. "Can third-party payments benefit the principal?: The case of soft dollar brokerage," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 56-77, March.
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Keywords
project evaluation; capital rationing; agency; pre-contract private information;All these keywords.
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