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A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design

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  • Richard D. McKelvey

    (California Institute of Technology)

Abstract

This paper formalizes the problem of designing optimal agendas for voting over finite alternative spaces, when voters are assumed to be "naive," (i.e., they do not vote strategically). The class of agendas considered here is quite broad, and includes, as special cases, such methods as pairwise voting, sequential and elimination procedures, partitioning schemes, and all binary procedures. Given individual preferences over the basic alternative space, and various assumptions about how individuals choose between subsets of alternatives, one can then formalize the problem of designing agendas as a dynamic programming problem and solve for optimal agendas, i.e., agendas having either the highest probability of leading to a given alternative or having the highest expected utility to the agenda setter. Illustrations are given showing how the methods can be applied in specific examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard D. McKelvey, 1981. "A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(3), pages 303-321, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:27:y:1981:i:3:p:303-321
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.27.3.303
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    Cited by:

    1. Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A. & Masatlioglu, Yusufcan, 2014. "A foundation for strategic agenda voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 91-99.
    2. Karim Ben Slimane & Bernard Leca, 2012. "Pour une approche par les ressources du travail institutionnel," Post-Print hal-02542229, HAL.
    3. Guney, Begum, 2014. "A theory of iterative choice in lists," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 26-32.

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