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Consumer Reactions to Drip Pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Shelle Santana

    (Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163)

  • Steven K. Dallas

    (Duke University School of Law, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708
    Marketing Department, Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York 10012)

  • Vicki G. Morwitz

    (Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027)

Abstract

This research examines how drip pricing—a strategy whereby a firm advertises only part of a product’s price up front and then reveals additional mandatory or optional fees/surcharges as the consumer proceeds through the buying process—affects consumer choice and satisfaction. Across six studies, we find that when optional surcharges are dripped (versus revealed up front) consumers are more likely to initially select a lower base priced option which, after surcharges are included, is often more expensive than the alternative. Moreover, consumers exposed to drip pricing tend to ultimately select this lower base price but higher total price option, even after being exposed to the total price and given the opportunity to change their selection and even though they are relatively dissatisfied with it. We explore why drip pricing has these effects and find that they are driven by consumers’ perceptions regarding the costs and benefits of starting over and switching. Specifically, we find that high perceived search costs (study 2), self-justification (study 3), and mistaken perceptions regarding the potential gains of switching because of inaccurate beliefs that all firms charge similar additional fees/surcharges (study 4) all play roles. We discuss the implications of these findings for marketers, consumers, and policy makers.

Suggested Citation

  • Shelle Santana & Steven K. Dallas & Vicki G. Morwitz, 2020. "Consumer Reactions to Drip Pricing," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(1), pages 188-210, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:39:y:2020:i:1:p:188-210
    DOI: 10.1287/mksc.2019.1207
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Myongjin Kim & Qihong Liu & Nicholas G. Rupp, 2023. "When Do Firms Offer Higher Product Quality? Evidence from the Allocation of Inflight Amenities," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 62(2), pages 149-177, March.
    2. Avi Goldfarb & Ginger Jin & K. Sudhir, 2020. "Yale School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(1), pages 1-4, January.
    3. Bertini, Marco & Buehler, Stefan & Halbheer, Daniel, 2020. "Pricing and Supply Chain Transparency to Conscientious Consumers," Economics Working Paper Series 2020, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.

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